Privileging exploratory hands: prehension, apprehension, comprehension by Stuart, S.A.J.
  
 
 
 
 
 
Stuart, S.A.J. (2013) Privileging exploratory hands: prehension, 
apprehension, comprehension. In: Radman, Z. (ed.) The Hand, An Organ of 
the Mind: What the Manual Tells the Mental. MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Mass., UK. ISBN 9780262018845 
 
 
Copyright © 2013 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or 
study, without prior permission or charge  
 
The content must not be changed in any way or reproduced in any format 
or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holder(s)  
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details must be given 
 
 
 
 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/60040/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deposited on:  13 May 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk 
Privileging Exploratory Hands: prehension, apprehension,
comprehension
Susan A. J. Stuart
University of Glasgow
November 2011
Abstract
Through our hands we construct our world and through our construction of our world we construct
ourselves. We reach with our hands and touch with our hands, and with this reaching and touching we
come to understand how things feel and are. It is not an utterable knowledge, yet it is knowing the world in
a dynamically-engaged affective, effective way. Through affective feedback our reaching and touching be-
comes a prehensive grasping which leads, through the enkinaesthetic givenness of the agent with its world,
to a situated and embodied knowing, and the rudiments of apprehension. With each fresh comprehension
a new enkinaesthetic enquiry is engendered; with each enquiry we have afresh the anticipatory dynam-
ics of reaching, touching and feeling, with the hand-to-object of world-investigation, the hand-to-body of
auto-investigation and investigating the Other.
Introduction
It is reputed that Kant once said “The hand is the window to the mind.”, though a direct quotation that
possesses a neat and easy reference is unlikely to be forthcoming. Yet it is possible to follow some of
Kant’s earlier reasoning1 to demonstrate how this thought can well be ascribed to him. What’s more, we
can show how essential it is for his later writing where, although he avoids any obvious form of ontological
commitment to the nature of the human mind and any direct commitment to the physicality of the hands
and body, he nonetheless must do so, not merely as a transcendental condition, but because they perform
an essential corporeal and affective role in orientating the subject in space and establishing that subject’s
egocentric point of view. Our hands are the richly-sensitive instruments with which we begin the sensory
enquiry of lived experience, and it is through their feeling-engagement that we construct our world. This
claim will be supported by appeal to the affective kinaesthetic and enkinaesthetic engagement with which
we are necessarily bound in a relation of felt ‘withness’ with other agents, organisms, and things. As a
consequence of constructing our experiential world we discover ourselves as both transcendental condition
– there being a necessary a priori subject of experience, and as an antecedent physical entity, with our
sensuous embodiment making prehension, apprehension, by which I mean knowing that we know2, and
ultimately, a broader comprehension possible.
1The ‘earlier’ period referred to here is Kant’s ‘pre-critical’ period, and is associated with the period 1755-1770. It’s rather a shame
to use the term ‘pre-critical’ as Shell’s marvellous book, The Embodiment of Reason Kant on Spirit, Generation, and Community
[1996], attests. Kant’s ‘critical’ period ranges from 1781 to 1796 in which, perhaps most significantly, the Prolegomena and the three
Critiques were published.
2The action of grasping with the intellect, including forming an idea or conception.
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In this discussion I will be using the term ‘enkinaesthesia’ to mean the reciprocally affective neuro-muscular
dynamical flows and muscle tensions that are felt and enfolded between co-participating agents. We move,
touch and change one another in myriad different ways with touch having a “phenomenological primacy
over the other senses” [Ratcliffe, this volume] . To touch is to awaken to awareness, whether it be direct
or indirect touch. Direct touch includes the physical touch of a caress, a pat on the back, a hug, or the
rebuff of the shrugged pulling away from contact or the strike of a hand. Indirect touch can be achieved
through a look where one becomes the object of someone else’s attention and experience3, for example, in
an unspoken admonishment of a look or a wagging finger, a papal blessing which can shrive us of our sins,
a friend’s wave from a departing train, the touch of eyes that meet across a room, or in the way words and
language can alter the way we feel. And, so, it is clear that although there is no distinct organ of touch,
our hands and our skin incorporate the other senses and these inform the proprioceptive, kinaesthetic and,
because no touch is ever unidirectional, enkinaesthetic senses with their relative feedback. This is especially
evident in the intertwining or chiasm of clasped hands, where the touching hand is itself touched, or when I
touch my body in the the hand-to-body of auto-investigation, for then I experience both the touching and the
being touched. In that instant I am both subject and object.
This can happen only if my hand, while it is felt from within, is also accessible from without,
itself tangible, for my other hand, for example, if it takes its place among the things it touches,
is in a sense one of them, opens finally upon a tangible being of which it is also a part. Through
this crisscrossing within it of the touching and the tangible, its own movements incorporate
themselves into the universe they interrogate . . . We must habituate ourselves to thinking that
every visible is cut out in the tangible, every tactile being in some manner promised to visibility,
and that there is encroachment, infringement, not only between the touched and the touching
but also between the tangible and the visible . . . There is double and crossed situating of the
visible in the tangible and of the tangible in the visible . . . [Merleau-Ponty 1968, pp.133-4]
In sensing our world in the hand-to-object of world-investigation or hand-to-body of investigating the Other,
our hands make contact in a way that our eyes and ears do not: “in touch we directly appeal to the tactile prop-
erties of our own bodies in investigating the self-same tactile properties of other bodies” [O’Shaughnessy,
1989, p.38]. Yet, like the other senses, touch is inextricable from a dynamic moving, sensing and acting
living body.
I will develop my argument by using Kant’s 1768 essay Concerning the ultimate ground of the differentiation
of directions in space in conjunction with Woelert’s recent article on “Kant’s hands” [Woelert 2007] to
draw out why a failure in functional vertical symmetry establishes our physical spatiality and provides us
with a situated perspective on a world of other agents, organisms and things.4 In addition I will re-present
Woelert’s claim that Kant’s arguments, in this early period, anticipate claims for the constitutive force of the
body, yet these are claims which are more usually associated with the phenomenology of the early twentieth
century. This emphasis on the body is important because an agent’s action constitutes an affectively-laden
interrogation of its world, that is, a non-propositional somatosensory questioning of how our world is for us
now and, how we anticipate it will continue to be, and this is facilitated by our kinaesthetic and enkinaesthetic
engagement. What we discover in this fundamental action is not, at first, an utterable knowing – it is not
associated with speech or formal conceptualisation; it is pre-conceptual. Reaching and touching constitutes
3For an interesting elaboration of how we can be affected by the look of another read Chapter 1 of Part 3 of Being and Nothingness
by Sartre.
4The term ‘functional vertical symmetry’ is used deliberately to emphasis the necessity of movement and action in speaking about
alignment and orientation, for enantiomorphism alone cannot explain our egocentric orientation. Our hands might very well not have
been enantiomorphic, it is, after all, only a contingent feature of our bodily structure, yet we would still have and be able to speak about
a right and a left side, and right and left can only be demonstrated and comprehended in the functioning of our hands, or arms, legs,
shoulders, and so on.
2
a prehensive grasping5 and which forms the essential background to a situated and embodied knowing,
and this provides the rudiments of apprehension. With each fresh knowing, or embodied comprehension,
a new enkinaesthetic enquiry is engendered. With each enquiry we have afresh the anticipatory dynamics
of reaching, touching and feeling, with the hand-to-object of world-investigation, the hand-to-body of auto-
investigation, and the hand-in-hand of investigating the other. In the second half of the paper I will turn to
the body and, specifically to the hands, arguing that all the senses but, with greatest vivacity, the hands and
touch open new horizons of sensuous opportunity, proximity, and closeness to others: agents, organisms,
and things.
Enantiomorphic Hands and their Constitutive Role in our Experience
By means of a geometrical proof Kant demonstrates that our hands play a crucial role in proving the existence
of an absolute space that exists around us and through which we move. Though his proof is geometrical in
spirit its consequence is phenomenological, and most interestingly phenomenological because, of all the
possibilities within our functional vertical symmetry, ears, nostrils, eyes, arms, legs, and so on, he choses the
hands, hands which feel and grasp and bring us explicitly into a pre-noetic epistemic phenomenology.
If we permit ourselves a momentary consideration of this issue we can begin to make sense of some of the
reasons why Kant may have chosen the hands to exemplify the notion of irreconcilable spatial opposition
and our physical being in the world. For one thing our hands, but not our nostrils, eyes and ears or tongue,
are laid out before us and can become the focus of these other senses. For another, in their dexterous,
and sometimes not so dexterous, fingering and handling engagement our hands express our, predominantly,
pre-propositional questions about how our world continues to be – searching, fumbling, reaching, touching,
grasping, lifting, holding, caressing, stroking, feeling, the size, shape, texture, tension, density, softness, and
pliability of that with which we are in immediate encounter. Through this swiftly habituated affective tactual
perception our hands become the means for a great deal of our skilful engagement with our world. Yet, there
is a problem. As Wilson [1998] states in his Prologue: “Our lives are so full of commonplace experience in
which the hands are so skillfully and silently involved that we rarely consider how dependent upon them we
actually are.” [p.3]. They are our sensuous root in and route into our world, yet as a result of their success
they become, in many ways, invisible.6 From as early as eleven weeks the foetus stretches, reaches and
touches the local world within which it is situated.
Human foetuses tentatively touch the placenta, umbilicus and the uterine wall with their hands
at 11 weeks. They make jaw movements and swallow amniotic fluid, expressing pleasure or
disapproval at tastes injected into it by sucking and smiling or grimacing with disgust. Complex
movements of trunk, arms and legs position the body, and may react to the mothers body move-
ments and the contractions of the muscles of her uterus (Lecanuet, et al., 1995; Piontelli, 2002;
Trevarthen, et al., 2006). (Trevarthen and Reddy, 2007)
When asked ‘where are you’ we often gesture vaguely to our chest, the site of our felt breathing and heartbeat,
or to somewhere behind our eyes, even though we only sometimes consciously direct their gaze. We rarely
open our hands out in front of our body and say “This is where I am.”. We can look down at our chest, but
our eyes, our ears and nostrils are invisible to us unless we perceive them in a mirror or touch them with
our hands. Our arms and legs may raise us up and, even, propel us forward into the space around us, yet it
is our hands which disclose our world to us, sensually eliminating the apparent barrier between us and our
5The term ‘grasping’ is deliberately ambiguous, taken to mean both taking hold with our hands and understanding.
6One might consider in this context the phrase that has become the byword for familiarity: “I know X like the back of my hand”,
but when asked to describe the back of our hand we find ourselves at a complete loss.
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world.7 They express explicitly our intertwining with our world where we oscillate between experiencing
as perceiving object and being the subject of perception: “When I press my two hands together, it is not a
matter of two sensations felt together as one perceives two objects placed side by side, but of an ambiguous
set-up in which both hands can alternate the roˆles of ‘touching’ and being ‘touched’.” [Merleau-Ponty 1962,
p.93] These points, I will maintain, were, in some form, apparent to Kant.
So, let’s return to Kant’s proof. His intention is to prove that “Absolute space, independently of the existence
of all matter and as itself the ultimate foundation of the possibility of the compound character of matter, has
a reality of its own.” (Kant 2002, p.366; emphasis as in original), and the basis for his claim is that it is only
with reference to the sides of our body, and more specifically our hands, that we can even begin to make
sense of geographical orientation [Gegend / Gegenden, according to Walford [2001]] and the notion we have
of distinct places [Lagen]. His formal argument states that:
If two figures drawn on a plane surface are equal and similar, then they will coincide with each
other. But the situation is often entirely different when one is dealing with corporeal extension
[bodies] . . . They can be exactly equal and similar, and yet still be so different in themselves that
the limits of the one cannot also be the limits of the other . . . [T]he most common and clearest
example is furnished by the limbs of the human body, which are symmetrically arranged relative
to the vertical plane of the body. The right hand is similar and equal to the left hand. And if one
looks at one of them on its own, examining the proportion and the position of its parts to each
other, and scrutinising the magnitude of the whole, then a complete description of the one must
apply in all respects to the other, as well.
I shall call a body which is exactly equal and similar to another, but which cannot be enclosed
in the same limits as that other, its incongruent counterpart. [Kant 2002, pp.369–70]
His point is clear, the intrinsic descriptions of the relations of the parts of a hand are equivalent whether
we refer to the left or the right hand, but the hands themselves are mirror images of one another. They
are enantiomophs which evade “integration into a homogenous and purely self-referential form of space”
[Woelert 2007, p.139] within which they could dissolve and disappear from the physical world. It is the fact
that they don’t and can’t that is crucially important. Our hands are equal and similar in the relation of their
parts, but their distinct orientations demonstrate that they are topologically non-identical. As Hanna says:
[I]ncongruent counterparts are perceivable mirror-reflected spatial duplicates that share all the
same monadic properties, have exactly the same shape and size, and correspond point-for-point,
but are in different places and cannot be made to coincide by rigid translation within the same
global orientable space (an orientable space is a space with intrinsic directions). Even more
briefly put, incongruent counterparts are enantiomorphs. Enantiomorphs are qualitatively iden-
tical but topologically non-identical. [Hanna 2008, p.53-4]
7“The boundaries which seem to separate us from our worlds open us up to those worlds and reveal to us our inseparability from
them. Those boundaries which can appear, at first, rigid and fixed are often malleable and semi-permeable. We need think only of the
skin with its surfaces within surfaces [Hoffmeyer 2008, pp17-38], the biological membranes of stratum corneum, epidermis, dermis
and subcutaneous tissue, and our sense receptors and nerves; then there are the hairs that respond to temperature, which can stand erect
if we are suddenly fearful, and which can be brushed by a sleeve or touched gently by a breeze; and then there are the non-biological
membranes of clothes with their textures and degrees of translucency, and our personal and social boundaries which vary in relation to
our moods and emotions, our confidence, our company, our feeling of well-being and health, and so on. Our natural assumption is to see
the boundary of the body as the limit of our experiential world, but it is precisely its semi-permeable nature its breach which provides us
with the possibility of experience in the first place. The skin, overrun with an abundance of receptors – sixty kilometres of nerve fibres,
fifteen kilometres of veins, with millions of sense receptors for pain, temperature, pressure and touch [Hoffmeyer 2008, p.18] – opens
us up to the world and discloses it through our inescapable engagement with it, and then, of course, the skin is supplemented by the
plenisentience of visual, proprioceptive, kinaesthetic, auditory, gustatory, and olfactory senses which open us up in their own way, are
affected by change or motion within our world and which, with internal feedback, can bring about affective change within themselves.”
[Stuart 2010, p.306]
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It is their topological non-identity, emphasised by their inherent directionality, which forces them apart
into different places within a space that is ontologically, but – though it seems unnecessary to say it – not
epistemically or phenomenologically, independent of us. Kant continues:
[I]magine that the first created thing was a human hand. That [hand] would have to be either a
right hand or a left hand. The action of the creative cause in producing the one would have of
necessity to be different from the action of the creative cause producing the counterpart.
Suppose that one were to adopt the concept entertained by many modern philosophers, espe-
cially German philosophers, according to which space simply consists in the external relation
of the parts of matter which exist alongside each other. . . . [Since] there is no difference in the
relation of the parts of the hand to each other, and that is so whether it be a right hand or a left
hand; it would therefore follow that the hand would be completely indeterminate in respect of
such a property. In other words, the hand would fit equally well on either side of the human
body; but that is impossible. (Kant 2002, p.371)
This impossibility, because there exist failures in our functional vertical symmetry, makes it possible to
establish both our physical spatiality as corporeal bodies and our individually situated perspectives on our
world. Additionally, and crucially, it makes possible our ability to align or orient ourselves in space, firstly in
relation to the directionality of our hands in their touch and in their grasp, and then in their motile relation to
other objects, agents, people, and our own body.8 As Hanna says, Kant’s argument thus demonstrates “that
the actual space of perceivable material bodies is intrinsically directional (i.e., orientable) and egocentrically-
centered”. [Hanna 2008, p.55] So, to take a concrete example, we understand the orientation of a map and
the direction shown by a compass needle in relation to how we, with our hands, are holding the instruments
and, thus, in orientation to our corporeally extended body. This is not to deny other salient cues (or clues),
like the orientation of the written script, the positioning of the cardinal points, and so on, but recognising
them and grasping them as meaningful comes much later in a mediated conceptualisation of what is, at first,
sensuously and immediately to hand. This two phase understanding is not lost on Kant for he says “Even
our judgements relating to the cardinal points of the compass are, in so far as they are determined in relation
to the sides of our body, subject to the concept that we have of directions in general.” [Kant 2002, p.367].
Fundamentally we possess a “referential anchoring in the oriented structure of the human body” [Woelert
2007, p.142] and this is understood with reference to “universal space as a unity” [Kant 2002, p.365].9 Thus
Woelert continues:
[I]t is only via our body that we can distinguish between these Gegenden10 in space, and it is
only in doing so that we (as situated in space through our body) are able to actually grasp space
as a whole in the first place. . . . space is of direct practical use only when we can relate it to the
primordial spatiality of our body . . . . [Woelert 2007, p.142]
Key to this passage are the notions of ‘via our body’ and ‘grasp’; the former because of its emphasis on the
processual physicality of movement, sensing, orientation and location, and the latter because, although it
8More will be said about this in the next section; for now our emphasis is on orientation and directionality, and establishing a
corporeally-based perspective.
9The greater context is given as: “The direction [Gegend], however, in which this order of parts is directed (wohin diese Ordnung
der Theile gerichtet ist), refers to the space outside the thing. To be specific: it refers not to places [Lagen] in the space – for that would
be the same thing as regarding the position of the parts of the thing in question in an external relation (in einem a¨usseren Verha¨ltnis)
– but rather to universal space as a unity, (auf den allgemeinen Raum als eine Einheit) of which every extension must be regarded as
a part.” [Kant 2002, pp.365-6]. Walford [2001] presents a compelling case for Kant’s argument making sense, only if ‘Gegend’ is
translated as ‘direction’ or Richtungen, as Kirchmann [1873] does, and not as ‘region’ as other commentators have done.[Walford’s
own recommendation for where this ‘error’ can be seen most clearly is in Van Cleve & Frederick’s collection of essays (1991)].
10Woelert translates Gegenden as ‘regions’. Whether we use ‘regions’ or ’orientations’ in this particular quotation makes no material
difference to the import of this present paper.
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is used as a metaphor for understanding, it appeals to our original pre-linguistic manual prehension of our
world and how our sensory engagement comes to have meaning for us.11 It is within this intricate sensory,
manual, somatic, affective interplay – the kind we associate primarily with the reaching, touching, groping
and grasping of young children and mistakenly think secondary in the language-using organism – that we
embody our pragmatic concernful relations. [Merleau-Ponty 1962; Heidegger 1968; Gendlin 1992] Which
is merely to say, as others have said before, that it is from the cycle of perception and action that meaning for
the organism emerges. [See, for example, Lakoff & Johnson (1980), von Uexku¨ll (1982), Johnson (1987),
Hodges (2007), Hodges & Baron (2007), and Steffensen & Hodges (2010).] “[E]very action, therefore, that
consists of perception and operation imprints its meaning on the meaningless object and thereby makes it
into a subject-related meaning-carrier in the respective Umwelt (subjective universe)” [von Uexku¨ll 1982 /
1940, p.31]. In this respect the moving, feeling body has a constitutive role, for every action is affectively
replete with concernful, values-realising exploration within the immanent habitus of the agent.
Hands as the Orienting Structures of Self-referential Anchoring
Referential anchoring begins with the body but is phenomenally most striking through the orientating struc-
tures disclosed in the unfolding of our hands in space before us and around us. As our hands open out with
their palms facing up we feel, as it were from the inside, and see, as it were from the outside, ourselves,
oriented against background phenomena. In the dark my groping with my right hand does not feel like grop-
ing with my left; they have a distinct phenomenal orientation which forms in us, passively and involuntarily,
and constructs a distinct phenomenal-somatic alignment with our world. When I grasp the apple in front of
me with my right hand, my thumb is on the left; when I grasp with my left hand the position of my thumb
is reversed, the same is true if one hand is grasping the other; they each possess a unique orientation or
11Kant is notable amongst his fellows for claiming that “There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience.” [Kant
1929, B1 p.41] without dissolving into scepticism as Hume [1978] and Berkeley [1710] did before him. Berkeley’s famous dictum esse
est percipi (aut percipere) – to be is to be perceived (or to perceive), follows from a marvellously clear claim he makes in Principles:
It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible
objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But, with how
great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his
heart to call it in question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For, what are the fore-
mentioned objects but the things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations?
and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived? [Berkeley
1710, p.31]
It is the imagination, as ‘metaphysical glue’, in Hume’s writing which gives us our natural tendency to believe in the existence of real
and persistent mind-independent objects. Otherwise, “what Hume discovered is that rational analysis of our ideas shows that, except
for mathematics, our ideas are inadequate representations of the reality they purport to be about” [Livingston 1984, p.194].
The central intention of the first Critique, from which the quotation is taken, is to determine the necessary pre-conditions for the very
possibility of experience and, as mentioned earlier, he makes no explicit ontological commitment to the nature of such transcendental
conditions. (This is by no means a criticism of Kant; two hundred-plus years later our position on the categorial structures for experience
and the integration of the senses is still some distance from resolution.) However, the claim for experience as fundamental is not made
lightly and it becomes clear to the reader that the transcendental conditions include, not only space and time as a priori forms of
intuition, the a priori categories of the understanding, and the transcendental unity of apperception, but also the existence of a spatially-
extended physical world which we come to know through our affective corporeal engagement, and which orientates us and establishes
our point of view.
But Kant’s triumph in this respect is relatively short-lived; all too soon again we cognitivise and disembody the human mind.
Thought is given a pre-eminence over feeling and bodies become the otherwise invisible vehicles of content. Under this conception our
referential anchor shifts from the body to the relative latecomer, the disembodied pronoun, ‘I’, which, through its use as some sort of
communicative prosthesis, claims to refer to the – entirely illusory – ‘self’ which is neither animated physical agent, nor historically,
socially and morally-formed person. [Stuart 2006] Cognitivism and computationalism are two of the greatest culprits in this area for
they present the mind as symbolic, representational, and reducible to a set of physical states and processes that are fully-explicable
through scientific experiment and analysis. These theories emphasise the ‘mental’, in this case the propositional and disembodied, at
the expense of the physical, and continue to forge a spurious dichotomy, whilst mostly claiming not to be dualist. It is most perplexing.
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directionality. So it is, that each hand, in its affective-anticipatory, enkinaesthetic engagement has a distinc-
tive feel which brings with it, implicitly and involuntarily, the direction of my body. If we think again of
the map, there are lots of cues for its orientation in relation to us, but primarily these are phenomenal and
distinctly left and right; I could not have my hands crossed, or have the map behind me or to one side, with-
out the phenomenal experience being entirely distinct and, what’s more, distinguishable at a somatosensory
kinaesthetic, and thus, enkinaesthetic level.
This deeply felt engagement takes place amidst the multifarious modes of pre-noetic self-givenness,12 but
in the movement of our hands this givenness has a distinctive flavour; it is one in which we experience si-
multaneously the interiority of ‘auto-affection’ [Henry 1963] alongside the putative exteriority of the visual
sensation. This is not a characteristic shared by any other sense because of the phenomenological primacy of
touch. In the plenisentient activity of the senses and, thus, in our experience more broadly, our hands are in-
extricably entangled. Their entanglement possesses a “presentational immediacy”, whether it is of one hand
touching or grasping the other or the “perceptive mode in which there is clear, distinct consciousness of the
‘extensive’ relations of the world.” [Whitehead 1978, p.61], and it brings about the collapse of the artificial
interior-exterior sensory division and is suggestive of an altogether more radical interiority. [Henry 1963]
The synthesis of such a radical interiority is characterised by its immanence, its direct non-duality, through
which the senses, including the enkinaesthetic sense and the proprioceptive and vestibular systems, consti-
tute the agent’s ‘sense-full’ givenness. In this context ‘sense-full’ implies replete, that is, full of the senses
(plenisentient), but it also implies coherent in the sense that “the reactions of an organism are not edifices
constructed from elementary movements, but gestures gifted with an internal unity” [Merleau-Ponty 1963,
quoted Baldwin 2004, p.51], and full of meaning in its pragmatic values-realising, concernful enaction.13
Concernful enaction emphasises agential, sensory and “corporeal anticipation” [Sennett 2008], described
enkinaesthetically, because of its inherent affective community and reciprocity, as the organism’s anticipa-
tory affective dynamics [Stuart 2010 & in progress]; and such dynamics make possible the formation of
kinaesthetic memories, melodies and habits. “[W]ith the development of motor skills the individual im-
pulses are synthesized and combined into integral kinaesthetic structures or kinetic melodies” [Luria 1973,
p.176] which possess an “internal articulation and as a kinetic melody gifted with a meaning . . . [they
carry within themselves] . . . an immanent intelligibility” [Merleau-Ponty 1963, quoted Baldwin 2004, p.51].
It is, as Merleau-Ponty says, that “habit has its abode neither in thought nor in the objective body, but in the
body as mediator of a world” [Merleau-Ponty 1962, p.168], and there is no more palpable sensory mediator
than our hands and our skin. It is through our hands that we first develop kinaesthetic habits, like grasping a
rattle or taking hold of our foot, which bring with them expectations and anticipations of how our world will
continue to be.
In a pre-noetic sense we speak of the lived and knowing body, as opposed to the “Cartesian corpse” [Leder
1992]14 of our practices as skillful, and of the way in which habitual actions can be characterised by the
readiness-to-hand of absorbed coping, possessing a
. . . practical non-thetic intentionality [which] has nothing in common with a cogitatio (or a noe-
sis) consciously orientated towards a cogitatum (a noema), . . . [but is] rooted in a posture, a way
12The givenness and ownership of an agent’s experience results from the agent’s neuromuscular dynamics – without movement there
can be no affect, without affective movement, there is no agential givenness. Affective movement is always with, and within, the agent’s
world, so, givenness is at core necessarily enkinaesthetic.
13‘Sense-full’ is a term coined by O’Connor [2007] when she speaks of the bodily intentionality manifested in the performance of a
skilled action; she says: “Thus, in virtue of bodily intentionality, the particular techniques become ‘sense-full.”’ In addition it is also
very satisfyingly redolent of ‘hand-full’ and full hands.
14Feuerbach is a super nineteenth century example of such writing: “Only the sensuous is clear and certain. Hence, “the secret of
immediate knowledge is sensuousness” [Feuerbach 1843/1972, GW IX: 321; PPF 55]. “Whereas the old philosophy started by saying,
“I am an abstract and merely a thinking being to whose essence the body does not belong”, the new philosophy, on the other hand,
begins by saying, “I am a real, sensuous being and indeed, in its totality is my ego, my essence (Wesen) itself.” [ibid., GW IX: 320;
PPF 54] “When sensuousness begins all doubts and quarrels cease. The secret of immediate knowledge is sensuousness”. [[ibid., §38]
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of bearing the body (a hexis), a durable way of being of the durable modified body which is
engendered and perpetuated, while constantly changing . . . in a twofold relationship, structured
and structuring, to the environment. [Bourdieu 2000, pp.143–144].
By “twofold” Bourdieu is not endorsing a dichotomy, rather he is emphasising the processual dynamic
structural coupling that exists for organisms and their worlds. As a recursively dynamic coupling it must
be enkinaesthetic, having the capacity to move and be moved, to shape and be shaped, and comprising no
well-defined boundaries between agents, actions, and objects.
If one may consider the environment of a system as a structurally plastic system, the system and
its environment must then be located in the intricate history of their structural, enkinaesthetic
transformations, where each one selects the trajectory of the other one. [Varela 1989 quoted in
Bitbol & Luisi 2004, p.102; where ‘enkinaesthetic’ is my addition.]
Cotterill [2001] comments on anticipation when he speaks of the difference between probing-by-movement
associated with simple organisms like Eschericia coli and Euglena gracilis and probing-by-proxy associated
with organisms that have both a central nervous system and muscle spindles. In both cases movement
is involved but in the latter it can be as a covert modification of existing reflexes, making possible the
anticipation of action possibilities, something which is crucial because “understanding is not concerned with
grasping a fact but with apprehending a possibility of being” [Ricoeur 1981, p. 56]. It is only in this way
that we can prepare for fulfilled anticipations, and for contingency and surprise.
[W]e are not conscious of something unless were [sic] are covertly setting up the muscular
movements associated with its perception, and such movements will have had to be learned
from prior experience. The mechanism thus mediates influence on a currently proceeding (or
currently planned) muscular act. That influence stems from motivation-triggered anticipation of
the act’s outcome . . . [Cotterill 2001, p.7]
And, in the preceding paragraph in his text there is even greater emphasis on the anticipatory mechanism in
relation to the prehension, and possible, apprehension of the intentional trajectory of the Other’s action and
movement.
The clue, I strongly feel, lies in the word anticipation. If we are not actively attending to some-
thing in our environment, our nervous system will not be able to predict the likely continuation
of that something’s present trend . . . ”. [ibid.]
Now let’s bring this discussion back to Kant and the crucial constitutive role in experience played by the
hands and the body. We have already seen that it is through our hands that we begin the richly sensitive
felt enquiry that composes our lived experience, and synchronous with this enquiry is the composition or
construction of a spatially-extended experiential world. With their non-reductive nature Kant has shown
that our, qualitatively identical but topographically non-identical, hands play an essential corporeal role in
establishing an external world and orientating us in space, but he is also aware of the affective nature of
this experience, that the phenomenal subject is not some abstract, yet logically necessary, transcendental
condition, but a sensuous physical entity.
In an intriguing paper, written in 1766, Kant claims that “I am just as immediately in the tips of my fingers,
as in my head.” [Kant 1766, p.49] for, he argues, “where I sense, there I am”. [ibid.]
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No experience teaches me to believe some parts of my sensation to be removed from myself, to
shut up my Ego into a microscopically small place in my brain from whence it may move the
levers of my body-machine, and cause me to be thereby affected. . . .my soul is as a whole in
my whole body, and wholly in each part. [ibid.; emphasis as original]
In these claims Kant brings together the notions of a transcendental egocentric point of view with an embod-
ied phenomenologically-rich subject of experience. In other words, it is a geometrically-borne, physically-
extended, enkinaesthetically-embedded subject that feels its way, searching and fumbling, reaching and
touching, grasping, lifting, holding, caressing, and stroking, towards a pre-noetic prehensive comprehen-
sion. In this unceasing process of investigation and manipulation the agent experiences – from moment
to moment – felt epiphanies, when the immanence of our engagement is disclosed,15 and reveal, an ever-
changing, flowing an updating range of, new action possibilities. Through this perpetual exploratory sensu-
ous entanglement we can know how to go on without knowing reflexively and propositionally that it is we
who know how to go on. This is not to suggest an absence of egocentricity, for it is very clear from Kant’s
writing that a first person perspective, as a nomologically necessary transcendental subject, is still present.
What we need to understand from his writing is that the egocentric point of view exists but is known only
because of the agent’s primitive and pervasive sensuous phenomenology.
I hold, [that] this ability of a conscious living organism like us to have a single point of view is
grounded in egocentrically centered embodiment, and a primitive bodily awareness that includes
proprioception (the sense of ones own body parts and limbs), kinaesthesia (the sense of bodily
movement), the sense of orientation and balance, bodily pleasures and pains, tickles and itches,
the feeling of pressure, the feeling of temperature, the feelings of vitality or lethargy, and so-on.
[Hanna 2008, p.59]
It is with, and only with, my body that I am able to exist in relation to things in the world, and it is with my
hands that I am able to directly manipulate and bring about change in my world, and yet at the same time it
is through my bodily sensing and touching engagement that I can experience, most readily, the immanence
of the Other in my enkinaesthetically attuned absorbed coping. Whitehead presents this forcefully when
he says that “the ‘withness’ of the body is an ever-present, though elusive element in pure perceptions of
presentational immediacy” [Whitehead 1978, p.474f]. The affectively-rich, or plenisentient, givenness of the
body is a necessary accompaniment to my experience, for the “primordial locality of the lived human body
becomes something that I am, . . . passively and habitually instituting the field of our subjectivity” [Woelert
2007, p.147]. Though Kant doesn’t refer to it in these terms, it is still the field of subjectivity, the ‘withness’
of the body, and the inherent directionality of felt engagement, to which he refers in this passage:
Considering the things which exist outside ourselves: it is only in so far as they stand in relation
to ourselves that we have any cognition of them by means of the senses at all. It is not therefore
surprising that the ultimate ground on the basis of which we form our concept of directions in
space, derives from the relation of these intersecting planes to our bodies. [Kant 1992, p.366]
There is an enkinaesthetic emphasis on the field of subjectivity which is necessarily composed of the sen-
suous activity of affective ‘being-with’ other agents and objects in the world. “[T]he human body invokes a
correction according to which space . . . is conceived not as a passive representation but as an active process
essentially structured by the subject’s directed and sensuous activity themselves.” [Woelert 2007, p.146]
Thus we can understand what it means when we say that it is through our hands that we construct our world,
that is, our field of subjectivity, and through our construction of our field of subjectivity that we construct
ourselves.
15One might also think of this in terms of Heidegger’s concepts of ‘de-distancing’, ‘disclosedness’ and ‘attunement’, but that must
await another opportunity. [Heidegger 1968]
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Conclusion
In conclusion let’s consider the place of our hands in the world; they don’t emanate from nowhere, they
belong in orientation and alignment with the rest of the body, but they are extended from the core of the
body and reach out to touch and manipulate what they perceive. They move in relation to one another,
frequently acting in conjunction, but sometimes not, and in this way they cannot be thought passive. Their
activity in our world is located in the intricate history of our structural, enkinaesthetically-felt coupling.
They encounter perturbations, feel difference, and engender change. It is swiftly apparent just how different
they are from the eyes or other senses, though it is the eyes which are usually taken to be our predominant
sense. Whilst it is true that we can touch someone with a look or affect someone with a gaze, and it is
true that all our sensory activity contributes to the formation of our subjective field, it is with our hands
that we most directly grasp and enact our sensory engagement. Through the eyes alone we have managed
to imagine ourselves a disembodied ego with a narrow to invisible field of subjectivity. But this cannot be
done if we accept our hands and our skin as our fundamental or primordial means for affective, effective
engagement with our world. Where the hands are recognised as the body’s animate instruments of direct
touch and change, the field of subjectivity cannot consist only of the pure ego, or of transcendental structures
alone. Historically we seem to “have ignored the more inarticulate background of feeling in which those
distinct elements are imbedded” [Cory 1933, p.31], and if now we “go back to the facts” and accept Kant’s
arguments for the constitution of an absolute and phenomenal space, we will be compelled to accept both
that “the transcendental functioning of space implies the transcendental functioning of the human body”
[Woelert 2007, p.145] and that our field of subjectivity is wide, sensuously-rich and constant only in its
capacity for change.
If the hand is the window to the mind, it is only because the hand can grasp its world, prehending and
comprehending it in ways that make the organism more effective in its engagement, and to do this it needs a
moving, feeling body that, in its affective enkinaesthetic activity, can anticipate and enact the hand-to-object
of world-investigation, the hand-to-body of auto-investigation and investigating the Other. It is only then
that the hand can construct its world and the mind can be revealed.
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